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Abstract 
Designing a  fully  secure (adaptive-predicate  unforgeable and  perfectly private)  attribute-based signature 
(ABS),  which allows a signer  to choose a set of attributes in stead  of a single string  representing the signer‘s 
identity, under  standard cryptographic assumption in  the standard model is a challenging problem. Existing 
schemes are either too complicated or only proved in the generic group model. In this paper, we present an 
efficient fully secure ABS scheme in the standard model based on q-parallel BDHE assumption which is more 
practical than the generic group model used in the previous scheme. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is 
the most efficient one among all the previous ABS schemes in the standard model. Moreover, our proposed 
scheme is highly expressive since it allows any signer to specify claim-predicates in terms of any predicate 
consists of AND, OR, and Threshold gates over the attributes in the system.  ABS has found many important 
applications in secure communications, such as anonymous authentication system and attribute based messaging 
system. 
Keywords 
Attribute-based signature, q-parallel BDHE assumption, standard model, unforgeability, privacy, collusion 
resistance 
INTRODUCTION 
Identity-based signature is a powerful mechanism for providing the authentication of the stored and transmitted 
information where the identity can be an arbitrary string such as an email address or a registration number, etc. 
While this is useful for applications where the data receiver knows specifically the identity of the data signer, in 
many applications the signer will want to have fine-grained control over how much of her personal information 
is revealed by the signature. 
Maji,  Prabhakaran, and  Rosulek (2008) presented   a  new  vision  of identity-based  signature that they called 
Attribute-Based Signature (ABS),  in which a signer is defined by a set of attributes instead of a single string  
representing the  signer‘s  identity. In ABS, a user obtains a set of attributes from one or multiple attribute 
authorities. An attribute-based signature assures the verifier that a signer, whose set of attributes satisfies a 
(possibly) complex predicate, has endorsed the message. The following example illustrates the concept.  
Suppose we have the following predicate:  
Professor OR (((Biology Department OR Female) OR above 50 years old) AND University A). 
Alice‘s attributes are (University A, Female). Bob‘s attributes are (above 50 years old, Professor). Although their 
attributes are quite different, it is clear that Alice and Bob can generate a signature on this predicate, and such a 
signature releases no information regarding the attribute or identity of the signer, i.e. Alice or Bob, except that 
the attribute of the signer satisfies the predicate. 
This kind of authentication required in attribute-based signatures differs from that offered by identity-based 
signatures. An ABS solution requires a richer semantics, including privacy requirements, similar to more recent 
signature variants like group signatures (Chaum; Heyst, 1991), ring signatures (Rivest; Shamir; Tauman, 2001), 
and mesh signatures (Boyen, 2007). All of these primitives share the following semantics: 
 Unforgeability. By verifying the signature, one is assured that the message was indeed endorsed by a party 
who satisfies the condition described in the claim. 
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 Privacy. The signature reveals no information about the signer other than the fact that it satisfies the claim. 
In particular, different signatures cannot be identified as generated by the same party. 
Besides these two semantics, ABS has another important property which is called collusion resistance. It assures 
different parties should not be able to pool together their attributes to sign a message with a claim which none of 
them satisfy alone. For instance, if Alice has  an attribute Female, and  her friend  Bob has an attribute Professor, 
they  should not  be able to sign a message claiming to have both  the attributes. 
ABS has found many important applications. For instance, it helps to provide fine-grained access control in 
anonymous authentication systems (Li; Au; Susilo; Xie; Ren, 2010). Another application of ABS, given by 
(Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2008; 2011), is to fulfil a critical security requirement in attribute-based messaging 
(ABM) systems using ABS. 
Related Work 
Attribute-Based Signatures were first introduced by Magi, Prabhakaran, and Rosales (2008) as a way to let a 
signature attest not to the identity of the individual who endorsed a message, but instead to a (possibly complex) 
claim regarding the attributes she possesses. They constructed an ABS scheme that supports a powerful set of 
predicates, namely, any predicate consists of AND, OR, and Threshold gates. However, the security of their 
scheme is weak as their construction is only proved in the generic group model. Since then, there have been lots 
of works on this subject (Escala; Herranz; Morillo, 2011; Khader, 2007a; 2007b; Li; Au; Susilo; Xie; Ren, 2010; 
Li; Kim, 2007; 2010; Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2011; Okamoto; Takashima, 2011; Shahandashti; Safavi-
Naini, 2009).  
Recently, Magi, Prabhakaran, and Rosulek (2011) presented an ABS scheme which is proven secure in the 
standard model. But it is much less efficient and more complicated  than  the  scheme  in  (Maji; Prabhakaran; 
Rosulek, 2008), since  it  employs  the  Groth-Sahai NIZK protocols (2008) as building  blocks. Okamoto and 
Takashima (Okamoto; Takashima, 2011) presented a fully secure attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme in the 
standard model. The admissible predicates of the scheme support non-monotone predicates. Escala, Herranz, and 
Morillo (2011) proposed a fully secure attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme in the standard model. This 
scheme supports an additional property of revocability, so that an external judge can break the anonymity of a 
signature when necessary. 
Another related notion to ABS is fuzzy identity-based signature which was proposed and formalized in 
(Shanqing; Yingpei, 2008; Yang; Cao; Dong, 2011). It allows a user with identity ω to issue a signature which 
could be verified with identity ω‘   if and only if ω and ω‘ are within a distance judged by some metric. 
However, this kind of signatures does not consider the anonymity for signer. 
 
Table 1: Comparison Of ABS Systems In Terms Of Signature Size, Model, 
Assumptions, Predicates, Two Examples Of Signature Size 
 MPR08 
(Maji; 
Prabhakaran; 
Rosulek, 2008) 
MPR11 
 (Maji; 
Prabhakaran; 
Rosulek, 2011) 
(Boneh-Boyen 
based) 
MPR11  
(Maji; 
Prabhakaran; 
Rosulek, 2011) 
(Waters  based) 
OT 
(Okamoto; 
Takashima, 
2011) 
EHM  
(Escala; 
Herranz; 
Morillo, 
2011) 
Proposed 
Signature  size (# of  
group elts) 
l + r + 2 51l + 2r+ 
18λl 
36l + 2r 
+9λ + 12 
7l + 11 9l + 7 4l + 1 
Model generic 
group model 
standard 
model 
standard 
model 
standard 
model 
standard 
model 
standard 
model 
Security full full full full full full 
Assmuptions CR   hash q−SDH  and 
DLIN 
DLIN DLIN and 
 
CR   hash 
CHD  and 
Subgroup 
Decision 
q−BDHE 
and 
CR  hash 
Predicates monotone monotone monotone non-monotone monotone monotone 
Sig.   size example  
1 (l=10,r=5, λ = 
128) 
17 23560 1534 81 97 41 
Sig.  size 
example  2 
(l=100,r=50, λ = 
128) 
152 282400 4864 711 907 401 
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Our Contribution 
Maji, Prabhakaran, Rosulek (Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2008; 2011) and Okamoto, Takashima  (2011) pointed 
that the future work of ABS, on the theoretical front, is to base the security of ABS on a standard hardness 
assumption, while still preserve the efficiency for the most part. In this paper, we attempt to propose such an 
ABS scheme which is secure in the standard model based on decisional parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
exponent assumption (Waters, 2011) which is more practical than the generic group model of (Maji; 
Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2008). 
The proposed ABS scheme is efficient and practical.  We compare our scheme with the existing ABS schemes in 
the standard model: Maji, Prabhakaran, and Rosulek‘s (2011) (two typical instantiations), Okamoto and 
Takashima‘s  (2011), and Escala, Herranz, and Morillo‘s (2011), as well as the ABS scheme in the generic group 
model  (Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2008) (as a benchmark). All of these schemes can be implemented over a 
pairing group and the size of a group element is about the size of Zp (e.g., 256 bits).  In Table 1 we summarize 
the comparison. 
In Table 1, l and r represent the size of the underlying access structure matrix M for a predicate, i.e. M ∈ Zl×r. 
We also give comparison  of two examples,  the predicate with 4 AND and 5 OR gates as well as 10 variables  
which is expressed by a 10 × 5 matrix, and the predicate with 49 AND and 50 OR gates as well as 100 variables  
which is expressed by a 100 × 50 matrix  (see the appendix  of (Lewko; Waters, 2011)). λ is the security  
parameter (e.g. 128).  
As the above comparison, our construction is the most efficient ABS scheme in the standard model of the 
literature. 
NOTATIONS 
 
We denote the finite field of order q  by qF . We also denote the group {0,1, , 1}p   under addition modulo 
p  by p , and \{0}p  by
*
p , where p  is a large prime number satisfying 2 1p p   with p  itself 
prime. A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over p , e.g. x  denotes
1
1( , , )
n
n px x
  . :y z  
denotes that y  is defined by z . We use 1 2, ,x x  span  denotes the subspace generated by 1, , nx x . For 
two vectors 1( , , )nx x x   and 1( , , )ny y y  , ·x y  denotes the inner-product
1
n
i i
i
x y

 . X T  denotes the 
transpose of matrix X . ( )det M  denotes the rank of matrix M . We denote a monotone span program (Beimel, 
1996) over a field qF  as : ( , )M M  in which there exists a linear secret sharing scheme (Okamoto; 
Takashima, 2011). We define our attribute-based signature scheme, which consists of four algorithms, namely, 
setup algorithm Setup , private key generation algorithm KeyGen , signing algorithm Sign , and verification 
algorithm Verify , and its security definition as (Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2008). We denote G  and TG  
as two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p , g  as a generator of G , and e  as a bilinear map, 
: Te  G G G  (Boneh; Franklin, 2003). 
OUR CONSTRUCTION 
 
Our construction is inspired by the attribute based encryption scheme (ABE) of Waters (Waters, 2011). Roughly 
speaking, a secret signing key SSK  with attribute set S  corresponds to a secret decryption key SSK  with S  
in ABE (Waters, 2011). No counterpart of a signature   in our construction exists in the ABE (Waters, 2011). In 
order to meet the privacy condition for  , a novel technique is applied to randomly generate a signature from 
the private key SSK  and the claim-predicate  . And there are many subtleties in the proof of unforgeability, 
e.g., we need to cancel all the unknown terms in order to answer the queries and solve the q  BDHE problem. 
We develop a novel technique to resolve the difficulty. See the proof for more details.  
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Let U  be the universe of possible attributes. A claim-predicate over U  is a monotone boolean function, whose 
inputs are associated with attributes of U . We say an attribute set S  U satisfies a claim-predicate   if
( ) 1S  . 
 
Setup  (U ): The input parameter U  is the number of attributes in the system. Choose suitable cyclic groups 
G  and TG   of prime order p , equipped with a bilinear pairing : Te  G G G . Choose a generator g  and 
U  random group elements 1, , Uh h G  that are associated with the U attributes in the system. Pick random 
number , pa  . Choose a collision resistant hash function
*:{0,1} pH  . The master key is 
MSK g . The public key PK  is a description of the groups , TG G  and their pairing function, as well as,    
1, ( , ) , , , , .
a
Ug e g g g h h
   
 
KeyGen  (MSK, S): On input the master secret key MSK and a set S  of attributes, the algorithm fist picks a 
random pt  . Create the private key SK  as 
.at t tx xK g g L g x S K h
      
 
Sign  (PK, sSK , M ,  ): On input the private key sSK  for an attribute set S , a message M ,and a claim-
predicate   such that ( ) 1S  . First convert   to its corresponding monotone span program ( )
l n
p
M
, with row labeling function   associates rows of M  to attributes. Computes 1( , , )l     such that 
1i i
i I


 M  and 0,i i I   , where iM  is the vector corresponding to the i th row of M , and 
: { | ( ) }I i i S  . If there is no such 'j  and J  that 
' 0j
j J
j M

  , let 1( , , ) (0, ,0)l      . In 
this case, any attribute set from { ( ) |1 }i i l    satisfies the claim-predicate  and the rank of matrix M  is 
less than l . Otherwise, chooses 1( , , )l     randomly from 
*1 l
p

 and solves the equation 
· · T TM M  to obtain 1, , l    . In addition, the algorithm chooses random 1, , , l pr r r  . 
 
The signature   is computed as follows, 
( || )( )ar HA K g   M
( || ) ( || ) ( || ) ( || )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( , , , fo)  r 1
i i i i i i i i i i i ir r H r r H H r r H
i i i i i i i iB g C h E K h h F L g g i l
       
   
            M M M M
 
, along with description of  . 
 
Here, three points should be noted. 
 
1. The signer may not have 
( )iK  for every attribute1 i l  . But when this is the case, 0i  , and so the 
value is not needed.  
 
2. ( || ) ( || ) 0i i it H r r H      M M  will not leak any information about the signer's attribute. 
Because this only occurs when 0  , which means any attribute set from { ( ) |1 }i i l    satisfies the 
claim-predicate  . Therefore, i could be zero whether i I  or not, so i  being zero has no relationship 
with the signer holding the attribute ( )i . Because if i  is chosen zero, the remaining ( \{ })j j I i    
still guarantees
\{ }
1
j I i
j j

 M . In this case, when ( || ) ( || ) 0i i it H r r H      M M , the 
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signer may either hold the attribute ( )i  or not hold the attribute ( )i . As a result, people gain no 
knowledge about whether the signer has the attribute ( )i  giving the knowledge of
( || ) ( || ) 0i i it H r r H      M M . 
 
3.   is a random vector from 1 np

 and has no relationship with   ( 0  ). Since 0  , we have
( ) ldet M . Given , there are ( )lp det M  possible   for · · T TM M . Here, ( )det M  is the rank of 
matrix M . Therefore, the probability to deduce i i
r
g

 successfully from 1, ,{ }
i ir
i ng

   is negligible, since 
p  is a large prime number.  
Verify ( PK, , M ): On input public parameters PK , the message M , and the signature   which is 
generated under the claim-predicate   such that ( ) 1S  . First convert   to its corresponding monotone 
span program ( )
l n
p
M  with row labeling function  . Choose a random vector 1 npv
 . Computes 
1 0( , , ) , 1ls s s v s v     
T T T T
M . Check the following constraints, 
? ?
( ) ( )( , ) ( ,1/ ), ( , ) ( , ), for 1i i i i i ie B g e C h e E g e F h i l      
0
0
?
( || )1
1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ,
( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))
i
i
l
s sa
i
H si
sa
i i i
i
i
l
i
e A g e B g
e g g
e C F e g F e B E
 




 


M  
returns accept if the above check succeed, and reject otherwise. 
 
[Correctness] 
0
1
1
( , ) ( , )
( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))
i
i
l
s sa
i
i
sa
i i i i i
l
i
e A g e B g
e C F e g F e B E



 


 
= 
0( || ) ( || ) ( || )
1
( || ) ( || ) ( || ) ( || ) ( || ) ( || )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( , ) ( , )
( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ))
i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
n
s r sH atH arH a
i
r t H r r H t H r r H r t H r r
l
i
H sa
i i i i
e g g g g e g g
e h g g g e g g g g e g h h h

          
   
  

  

   

 
M M M
M M M M M M
 
= 
*0 0 0( || ) ( || ) ( || )
1 1
( || ) ( || )
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
i i j j
i i i i i
l n
r vs H as tH ars H a
i j
l
t H r r H sa
i
e g g e g g e g g e g g
e g g g g

  
   
 

 

  

MM M M
M M
 
= 
*0 0 0
*1 1
( || ) ( || ) ( || )
1 1
( || )
· ( || )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
i i j i
l l
i i i i
i i ji i i
l n
rs H as tH ars H va
i j
H s s
r va t a a rH
e g g e g g e g g e g g
e g g e g g e g g

 

 
   
 




  




M
M
M M M
M
M
 
= 0
· ( || )
( , )
s H
e g g
 M
 
Note that * jM is the jth column of the monotone span program M . 
 
Theorem 1.   Our construction is correct and perfectly private. 
The proof of theorem 1 is given in the full version of this paper. 
 
Theorem 2. Our construction is (adaptive-predicate) unforgeable under the decisional q-parallel BDHE 
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assumption (Waters, 2011) and the existence of collision resistant hash functions. 
Proof: In this proof, we embed a random  attribute  into the public parameters  using parallel 
BDHE assumption. For each row  of  the simulator programs  pieces of information  
into the  related to the attribute assigned to that row. With this method, the simulator is able to cancel the 
unknown terms during private key queries and signature queries, as well as combine the forged signature to 
solve the parallel BDHE problem. 
 
Suppose an adversary  has a non-negligible advantage  advantage in attacking our scheme. We 
show how to build a simulator  that solves the decisional parallel BDHE problem.  
 
Initial Phase: The simulator takes in a decisional parallel BDHE challenge . The simulator randomly 
chooses a 2log 3k U t     attribute predicate  and converts  to its corresponding monotone span 
program , where  has  rows and  columns. Here,     is the round down operation,  is 
the maximum number of private key queries and signature generation queries, and . 
 
Setup Phase: The simulator chooses random  and implicitly sets  by letting 
. We describe how the simulator programs . 
 
For each  where  , it begins by choosing a random value . Let  denotes the set of indices of 
 such that . The simulator programs  as: 
* ** 2 *
*,1 ,2 ,
// /
n
ii i i i i nx
a M baM b a M bz
x
i X
h g g g g

   
If  then we have . Note that  are distributed randomly due to the  value. 
 
The simulator gives to  the public key:  
 
The corresponding master key, , is unknown to the simulator. 
 
Query Phase: In this phase the simulator answers private key queries and signature queries. Suppose the 
simulator is given a private key query for a set . 
 
If  satisfies , then the simulator aborts and randomly chooses its guess  of the parallel BDHE 
problem. Otherwise, the simulator first picks a random . Next it finds a vector 
 such that  and for all  where  we have that . By 
the definition of monotone span program such a vector must exist.  
 
The simulator begins by implicitly defining  as 
* 1
*
1
1 2
a nq q a
n
r w a w a w a
     . It performs this by 
setting .  
 
We observe that by our definition of ,  contains a term  which will cancel out the unknown term in 
 when generating . The simulator can compute  as: 
k *M xh q 
i
*M n * *,1 ,( , , )i i nM M
xh
q 
A  AdvAò
B q 
q  ,y T
* *
* *( , )M *M *l *n t
* *,l n q
p
1qa   
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
qa ae g g e g g e g g 

 1, , Uh h
x 1 x U  xz X
i
*( )i x  xh
X   xz
xh g xh
xzg
A
1, ( , ) , , , , .
a
Ug e g g g h h
 
MSK g
S
S *  q 
pr 
*
*
1
1( , , )
n
pn
w w w    1 1w   i
*( )i S  *· 0iw M
t
1
*1, ,
( )
q i
iwr a t
i n
L g g g
 
 
 
t atg
1qag

g K K
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2
*2, ,
( )
q i
iwar a
i n
K g g g
 
 
  . 
 
Now we calculate the key components  for . First, we consider  for which there is no  
such that . For those we can simply let . 
 
The more difficult task is to create keys for attribute , where there exists an  such that  and 
. To compute these keys we must make sure that there are no terms of the form  that we can't 
simulate. Notice that in calculating  all terms of this form come from , where . 
However we have that , all of these terms cancel. 
 
Again, let  be the set of all  such that . The simulator creates  in this case as follows.  
1
**
*
,
1,...
( / ) /
1, ,
( ( ) )
j a j k
i jx i i k
Mz a b r a b w
x
ki X j n n
k j
K L g g
  
   

    . 
 
The simulator  returns  to the adversary . 
 
To answer a signature query on ( , )M . If S  that satisfies   also satisfies * , the simulator aborts and 
outputs a random guess for  . Otherwise, the simulator randomly chooses a set S  that satisfies   but does 
not satisfy 
* , and asks the private key generation oracle to get the private key for S . Next, it uses the private 
key to generate the signature on ( , )M , and returns it to the adversary A . 
 
Forgery: After a polynomially bounded number of private key queries and signature queries, the adversary 
outputs a forged signature 
'
1, ,( , ( ) ,i i nA B     
' ' ' '
1, ,( , , , ) )i i i i i lC D E F    on message M  for the claim-
predicate  , such that ( , ) M  was never queried to the signature generation oracle and   does not accept 
any S  queried to the key generation oracle. If S  that is accepted by   but not accepted by * , the 
simulator aborts and outputs a random guess for  . Otherwise, the simulator can solve the decisional q 
parallel BDHE problem as follows.  
 
First, convert   to its corresponding monotone span program 
* *l n
p
M  with row labeling function  . 
The tricky part is to compute the i
as
g  since it contains terms (
ia sg ) that we must cancel out. However, the 
simulator can use secret splitting to make these terms cancel out. Intuitively, the simulator chooses random 
*2 , , ny y   . Then the simulator shares the secret using the vector 
*
2 1 1
2 3( , , , , )
n n
pn
v s sa y sa y sa y 
 
       . Next, we define 
*{ | ( ) ( ) , 1, , }iR k k i k i i n       . 
Suppose 
' '
1 , , lr r  are random values, we have the following equations,  
'
' i i i ir r sb
iB g g g
   ,
'
( )
i i i ir r sb
i iC h h


 
    
* ' *'
, ( ) ,
* *
· · ·( / )'
( )
2, , 1, ,
( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) )
j
i j j i k ji i i i k
i
M y z Mas r b s a s b ba
i i
k Rj n j n
g C h g g g


   
     
 
Thus, the simulator could compute i
as
g  and 
'
irg  as follows, 
xK x S  x S i
*( )i x  xzxK L
x S i *( )i x 
*i n
1 /q ia bg

t
x xK h
1
,/
q
i i j ja b M wg

*( )i x 
*· 0iw M
X i
*( )i x  xK
B ( , , ( ) )x x SK L K  A
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* ' *'
, ( ) ,· · ·( / ) '
( )
2, , 1, ,
( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) /
j
i j j i k ji i i i k
i
M y z Mas r b s a s b ba
i i
j n k R j n
g h g g g C


    
     
'
'/i i
r sb
ig g B  
 
Thus, the simulator compute 
'( , )i
as
ie F g  and 
'( , )i
as
ie B g  as follows. 
'( , )i
as
ie F g  
* *
, ( ) ,· · ·( / )' '
( )
2, , 1, ,
( , ) ( , ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) / )
j
i j j i k ji i i k
i
M y z Mr b s a s b ba
i i i i
j n k R j n
e F h e F g g g C
 

 
    
      
* ' *'
, ( ) ,· · ·( / )' ' '
2, , 1, ,
( , ) ( , ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) / )
j
i j j i k ji i i k
i
M y z Mr b s a s b ba
i i i
j n k R j n
e E g e F g g g C

    
      
 
'( , )i
as
ie B g  
* ' *'
, ( ) ,· · ·( / )' '
2, , 1, ,
( , ) ( , ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) / )
j
i j j i k ji i i k
i
M y z Mr b s a s b ba
i i i
j n k R j n
e B h e B g g g C


    
      
* *'
, ( ) ,· · ·( / )' ' '
2, , 1, ,
( , ) ( , ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) / )
j
i j j i k ji i i k
i
M y z Mr b s a s b ba
i i i
j n k R j n
e C g e B g g g C 

    
      
 
If 
' ' ( || ) ( || )
1 1
( ( , ) ( , )) / ( , ) ( , )i i
n l
as ass H s H
i i
j i
e A g e B g e F g T e g g
     
 
    M M , the simulator then outputs 
1   to guess that 
1
( , )
qa sT e g g

 ; otherwise, it outputs 0   to indicate that it believes T  is a random 
group element in TG .  
 
Next, we calculate the lower bound of the probability that the simulator completes without aborting. Without 
loss of generality we can assume the adversary always makes t  queries which are the maximum number of the 
private key query and signature generation query. For any set of t  private key queries on set 1, , tS S  and t  
signature queries on set 1 1( , ), , ( , )t tM M    and the forged matrix M , we have  
* * *
1 1Pr[ ] Pr[( ( ) 0) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))]
t t
i i i iS K K K K              abort  
Here, ( )K   is defined as the set of all attribute sets that satisfy  . We can then lower bound the probability of 
not aborting as follows. 
* * *
1 1Pr[( ( ) 0) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))]
t t
i i i iS K K K K               
* * *
1 1(1 Pr[ ( ) 1]) (1 Pr[ ( ) ]) Pr[ ( ) ( )]
t t
i i i iS K K K                  
* * *
1 1
(1 Pr[ ( ) 1]) (1 Pr[ ( ) ]) Pr[ ( ) ( )]
t t
i i
i i
S K K K
 
               
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1.4)
2 2 2U k U k U k
t t
  
      
 
Equations 1.4 comes from the fact that,  
* * * 1Pr[ ( ) 1] Pr[ ( ) ( )] Pr[ ( ) ( )]
2
i i U k
S K K K K

           . 
 
We can optimize the last equation by setting 2log 3k U t     (as we did in the simulation), where t  is the 
maximum number of private key queries and signature generation queries. Solving for this gives us a lower 
bound 
2
2
log 3
(1 )
2
U U t
t

   
   
2log 3
1
2
U U t   
 . Suppose the adversary succeeds with probability ò  after q  
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private key queries and signature generation queries, and this probability is independent of the random choices 
made by the simulator, we conclude that the simulator succeeds with probability, 
2 2
2
log 3 log 3
1
Pr[ 1| ]Pr[ ] Pr[ ] (1 ) .
2 2
U U t U U t
t

         
    abort abort abortò ò ò  
CONCLUSION 
We have presented an efficient and fully secure attribute-based signature system that is expressive and provably 
secure under decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption (Waters, 2011) in the standard model. We have proved that 
our scheme is (adaptive-predicate) unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack and perfectly private in 
the standard model. Our method of embedding a monotone span program into the public parameters allowed us 
to create clean, modular proof of security. The new construction is most efficient ABS scheme in the standard 
model comparing with the state-of-the-art (Escala; Herranz; Morillo, 2011; Maji; Prabhakaran; Rosulek, 2011; 
Okamoto; Takashima, 2011) construction. 
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